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Abstract
Climate change is now affecting agriculture and food production in every country of the world.
Here the authors present the IMPACT model results on yield, production, and net trade of
major crops in China, and on daily calorie availability as an overall indicator of food security
under climate change scenarios and socio-economic pathways in 2050. The obtained results
show a relatively optimistic outlook on yield, production and trade toward 2050. The outcomes
of calorie availability suggest that China will be able to maintain a level of at least 3,000
kilocalories per day through 2010 to 2050. Overall, Chinese agriculture is relatively resilient
to climate change. It is unlikely that Chinese food security by 2050 will be compromised in
the context of climate change. The major challenge to food security, however, will rise from
increasing demand coupled with regional disparities in adaptive capacity to climate change.
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1 Introduction 
The world faces multiple challenges to food security ranging from continuous 
population growth and rapid diet transition to decreasing cropland area and 
insufficient production practices (Beddington et al., 2012). The world’s 
population, for example, has increased from 1.65 billion in 1900 to over 6 
billion in 2000 and further to 7 billion in 2011 (Smith, 2011). Overall, food 
production per capita has remained stable during the twentieth century, largely 
due to technological advances. Breakthroughs in wheat and rice production, 
which have been known as the Green Revolution (Evenson and Gollin, 2003), 
have greatly contributed to the ease of the population burden in various parts 
of the world. However, some 800 million to 1 billion people still experience 
chronic and transitory hunger at present, partly due to the rapid rise in food 
price (Sanchez and Swaminathen, 2005; Borlaug, 2007). Global food prices 
have risen dramatically in the past few years and are forecast to rise further 
and become more volatile, disrupting assumptions that stable and declining 
food prices and assured supplies can be taken for granted (Beddington et al., 
2012). The food system faces additional pressure as the dominant diet pattern 
is shifting towards higher consumption of calories, fats and animal products. 
Moreover, as the dominant source of the human food supply, the per capita 
availability of world cropland has been decreasing at a rate of 0.8% per year 
during the twentieth century (Ramankutty et al., 2008) and will continue to 
decrease at the foreseeable future. The demand for cereals will probably grow 
by 50% until 2030 and even higher production will have to be achieved 
through agricultural intensification for a world of 9 billion people in 2050 
(Tilman et al., 2002; Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007). 
Climate change will further exacerbate the already-fragile global food 
production system and the natural resource base. Global surface temperature 
has increased 0.8°C during the twentieth century; four thirds of this increase 
occurred in the last three decades (Hansen et al., 2006; Ye et al., 2013a). The 
acceleration in global warming and its associated changes in precipitation 
have already affected global agriculture and the food production system in 
many ways (Godfray et al. 2011). Crop production is affected by climatic 
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variables such as rising temperatures, changing precipitation regimes and 
increased atmospheric CO2 levels (Long, 2012); it is also affected by 
biological variables such as the lengths of the crop growth periods and the 
crop cycle (Ye et al., 2013b). Experimental findings on wheat and rice under 
managed environments, for instance, indicated decreased crop duration (and 
hence yield) of wheat as a consequence of warming and reductions in yield of 
rice of ~5% °C-1 rise above 32°C (Gregory et al., 2005). These effects of 
temperature were considered sufficiently detrimental that they would largely 
offset any increase in yield as a consequence of increased atmospheric CO2 
concentration. It is clear that climate change has the potential to interrupt the 
progress toward a world without hunger (Wheeler and von Braun, 2013). This 
is particularly true for China as the world’s most populous country and the 
largest grain producer (Zhang et al., 2010; FAO, 2013). 
China embarked on economic reform more than three decades ago when 
the government introduced the household responsibility system (HRS) in 
agriculture. Price distortions were reduced, and key land rights were 
reallocated from collective farms to individual households across the country 
in late 1970s. Bold policies and institutional reforms motivated higher grain 
production and dramatically improved food security, which resulted in what 
was considered as “the greatest increase in economic well-being within a 15-
year period in all of human history” (Sachs et al., 1994; Zeng, 2010). During 
the past few decades, agricultural productivity rose steadily, and per capita 
grain output reached a level similar to that in developed countries. With 
sustained growth in agriculture, rural incomes rose significantly, permanently 
lifting millions of people out of poverty (Ye and Van Ranst, 2009). The 
Chinese population has increased over 30% since 1980, reaching 1.34 billion 
in 2010. The production of staple grains has generally come up with the 
population growth, enabling China to feed approximately 20% of the world’s 
population on less than 9% of the world’s cropland. Despite these notable 
improvements, food insecurity remains a fundamental issue for many poor 
and remote households (Huang and Rozelle, 2009). At present, more than 100 
million farmers and their families still live in poverty (Khan et al., 2009) and 
are vulnerable to many different kinds of stresses because they lack the 
financial resources to respond. The rural poor are particularly vulnerable to an 
uncertain climate. Moreover, although the average figures mentioned above 
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show substantial improvements in economic performance and human well-
being, substantial regional differences remain.  
As shown in Figure 1, the poverty rates of the densely populated 
provinces on the eastern seaboard, shaded in blue colors, are mostly lower 
than 20 percent of the population, while in the western provinces, shaded in 
red colors on map, the poverty rate is much higher; 60 to 90 percent of the 
population there earn less than the equivalent of US$2 per day.  
Therefore, the objectives of this paper are to (1) assess the effects of 
climate change on the yields of major crops in China in a spatial explicit 
manner using the CERES model; (2) predict the future trends of agricultural 
development in China in mid-21st century under climate change in terms of a 
range of food security indicators such as food trade, daily kilocalorie 
availability, number of malnourished children, etc.; and (3) formulate policy 
recommendations to ensure food security under climate change. 
Figure 1. Poverty as measured by population share (%) living on US$2 per day or less 
 
 
Source: Wood et al. (2010) available at labs.harvestchoice.org/2010/08/poverty-maps. 
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2 Material and Methods 
2.1 Land use and agriculture overview 
Satellite-based land cover inventory in year 2000, as mapped in Figure 2, 
shows that crop production is largely limited to the Three River Plain in the 
northeast, the North China Plain, the Loess Plateau, the lower Yangtze River 
Basin, and the Sichuan Basin as indicated by the “cultivated and managed 
areas” land cover type (Ye et al., 2008). Croplands in southeast, south, and 
southwest China are much fragmented, as indicated by the two “mosaic” land 
cover types, and are thus of secondary importance to agriculture. Aggregate, 
cropland is accounted for only 14% of the total land mass, which is equivalent 
to 0.1 hectares per capita. 
Key agricultural commodities in terms of area harvested and value for the 
period of 2006–2008 are given in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. Rice,  
 
Figure 2. Land cover inventory as in year 2000 
 
 
 
Source: GLC2000 (JRC, 2000). 
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maize and wheat are traditionally the most important crops in China. They 
take nearly half of the total area of major agricultural harvests. In monetary 
terms, these big three plus cotton account for 47% of the total value of key 
agricultural commodities listed in Table 2. Rice and maize are still in the top 
two positions, while cotton is in the third position with wheat ranking the 
fourth.  
The irrigated and rainfed production of major food crops were evaluated 
and mapped in terms of estimated yield and harvest area based on the SPAM 
dataset (You et al., 2009), as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 for wheat as an 
example. The estimated yield and harvest area maps for the other two major 
food crops in China, maize and rice, are shown in Figure S1 through Figure 
S4 as Additional Materials to this paper. 
Table 1. Harvest area of leading agricultural commodities, 
2006–2008 average 
Rank  Crop  % of total  Area harvested  
(000 hectares) 
1 Paddy rice 17.7% 29,291 
2 Maize 17.7% 29,288 
3 Wheat 14.3% 23,650 
4 Soybeans 5.5% 9,062 
5 Fresh vegetables  5.2% 8,532 
6 Rapeseed 3.7% 6,073 
7 Seed cotton 3.5% 5,834 
8 Potatoes 2.6% 4,367 
9 Groundnuts with shell 2.5% 4,190 
10 Sweet potatoes 2.2% 3,673 
 Total 100.0% 165,072 
Source: FAOSTAT (FAO, 2010)  
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Table 2. Value of production for leading agricultural commodities, 
2006–2008 average 
Rank  Crop  % of total  Value of Production 
(million US$) 
1 Paddy rice 20.7% 65,377 
2 Maize 11.6% 36,573 
3 Seed cotton 7.3% 22,988 
4 Wheat 7.2% 22,713 
5 Fresh vegetables 6.4% 20,049 
6 Apples 4.9% 15,306 
7 Asparagus 3.1% 9,747 
8 Groundnuts with shell 2.3% 7,222 
9 Lettuce and chicory 2.2% 7,065 
10 Soybeans 2.0% 6,367 
 Total 100.0% 315,479 
Source: FAOSTAT (FAO, 2010) 
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Figure 3. Yield and harvest area density of irrigated wheat in year 2000 
 
Yield 
 
Harvest area density 
Yield legend  
 
 
Harvest area  
density legend 
 
Source: SPAM Dataset (You et al., 2009). 
Figure 4. Yield and harvest area density of rainfed wheat in year 2000 
 
Yield 
 
Harvest area density 
Yield legend  
 
 
Harvest area  
density legend 
 
Source: SPAM Dataset (You et al., 2009). 
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2.2 Climate scenarios 
Four climate scenarios, downscaled from 4 GCMs – CNRM, CSIRO, 
ECHAM, and MIROC – driven by SRES emission scenario A1B or B1, were 
used to accommodate the likely ranges of future temperature and precipitation 
changes. The CSIRO scenario, for example, represents a dry and relatively 
cool future, while the MIROC scenario represents a wet and warmer future. 
The scenario-based temperature and precipitation were then utilized for crop 
modeling analysis. 
Figure 5 shows precipitation changes between 2010 and 2050 for China 
from 4 downscaled GCMs driven by the A1B emission scenario; Figure 6 
shows changes in maximum temperature for the month with the highest mean 
daily maximum temperature between 2010 and 2050 for China from the same 
GCMs. 
In one of the major agricultural regions in China, the North China Plain, 
for example, climate is expected to be drier according to the CNRM scenario; 
the annual precipitation can decrease by 100 mm (Figure 5). To the contrary, 
the MIROC GCM depicts a much wetter future in the same region – annual 
precipitation can be 100 mm higher in 2050 than in 2010. The same amount of 
precipitation can be expected in the North China Plain by 2050 under the 
other two GCMs – CSIRO and ECHAM. The disparity among GCM results 
explains why the multi-model ensemble approach is used to deal simulated 
crop yields under climate change scenarios. 
The GCM results are more unanimous on temperature change. They all 
depict a warmer future (Figure 6). The disagreement on temperature is much 
smaller than on precipitation. In North China Plain, temperature will increase 
1–2°C under CNRM, ECHAM, and MIROC, while the CSIRO GCM predicts 
a less warm future of <1°C. The general picture is that the higher latitudinal 
(e.g., Northeast) and higher altitudinal regions (e.g., Tibetan Plateau) are 
expected to receive higher warming, compared to the lower 
latitudinal/altitudinal regions.  
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Figure 5. Changes in mean annual precipitation for China between 2000 and 2050 using the A1B scenario (millimeters) 
 
CNRM-CM3 GCM 
 
CSIRO-MK3 GCM 
Change in annual precipitation 
(millimeters ) 
 
 
ECHAM5 GCM 
 
MIROC3.2 medium resolution GCM 
        Source: IFPRI calculations based on downscaled climate data available at http://ccafs-climate.org/.  
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Figure 6. Changes in normal annual maximum temperature for China between 2000 and 2050 using the A1B scenario (°C) 
 
CNRM-CM3 GCM 
 
CSIRO-MK3 GCM 
Change in annual maximum 
temperature (°C) 
 
 
ECHAM5 GCM 
 
MIROC3.2 medium resolution GCM 
  Source: IFPRI calculations based on downscaled climate data available at http://ccafs-climate.org/. 
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2.3 The modeling framework 
Three models were used in this paper to analyze the biophysical and 
socioeconomic consequences of climate change (Figure 7): IFPRI’s IMPACT 
model (Cline and Zhu, 2008), a partial equilibrium agriculture model that 
emphasizes policy simulations; a hydrology model and an associated water-
supply demand model incorporated into IMPACT; and the DSSAT crop 
modeling suite (Jones et al., 2003) that estimates yields of selected crops 
under varying management systems and climate change scenarios. The 
modeling methodology reconciles the limited spatial resolution of macro-level 
economic models that operate through equilibrium-driven relationships at a 
national level with detailed models of biophysical processes at high spatial 
resolution. The DSSAT system is used to simulate responses of five important 
crops (rice, wheat, maize, soybeans, and groundnuts) to climate, soil, and 
nutrient availability, at current locations based on the SPAM dataset of crop 
location and management techniques. This analysis is done at a spatial 
resolution of 15 arc minutes, or about 30 km at the equator. These results are 
aggregated up to the IMPACT model’s 281 spatial units, called food 
production units (FPUs, Figure 8). The FPUs are defined by political 
boundaries at the river basin scale.  
2.4 Income and demographic scenario settings 
Three pathway scenarios were designed using combinations of economic and 
demographic drivers to facilitate model simulations. These include a baseline 
scenario that is “middle of the road”, a pessimistic scenario that chooses 
driver combinations that, while plausible, are likely to result in more negative 
outcomes for human well-being, and an optimistic scenario that is likely to 
result in improved outcomes relative to the baseline. These three overall 
scenarios are further qualified by four climate scenarios (e.g., Figure 5). The 
drivers used for simulations with the IMPACT model include: population, 
GDP, rainfed and irrigated exogenous productivity and crop-specific area 
growth rates, irrigation efficiency, and future climate. In all cases except 
climate, the country-specific (or more disaggregated) values can be adjusted  
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Figure 7. The IMPACT modeling framework 
 
Source: Nelson et al. (2010). 
individually. Differences in GDP and population growth define the overall 
scenarios analyzed here, with all other driver values remaining the same 
across all the three socio-economic pathway scenarios.  
Table 3 documents the GDP and population growth choices for these three 
overall scenarios adopted in this paper. Table 4 shows the annual growth rates 
for different regional groupings as well as for China. Figure 9 illustrates the 
three GDP per capita scenario pathways, derived from the three GDP 
projections and the three population projections obtained from the United 
Nations Population office. The “optimistic scenario” combines high GDP with  
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Figure 8. The 281 food production units or FPUs adopted by the IMPACT model 
    
 
Source: Nelson et al. (2010). 
Table 3. GDP and population choices for the three overall socio-economic 
pathway scenarios 
Parameter Pessimistic  Baseline Optimistic 
GDP, 
constant 
2000 US$ 
Lowest of the four GDP 
growth rate scenarios 
from the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment 
GDP scenarios 
(Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2005) and 
the rate used in the 
baseline (next column) 
Based on rates 
from World Bank 
EACC study (World 
Bank, 2010), 
updated for Sub-
Saharan Africa and 
South Asian 
countries 
Highest of the four 
GDP growth rates 
from the Millennium 
Ecosystem 
Assessment GDP 
scenarios and the 
rate used in the 
baseline (previous 
column) 
Population UN High variant, 2008 
revision 
UN medium 
variant, 2008 
revision 
UN low variant, 2008 
revision 
Source: Based on analysis conducted for Nelson et al. (2010). 
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Table 4. Average scenario per capita GDP growth rates (percent per year) 
Category 1990–2000 2010–2050 
 
 Pessimistic Baseline Optimistic 
China 8.09 3.65 5.18 6.24 
Developed 2.7 0.74 2.17 2.56 
Developing 3.9 2.09 3.86 5 
Low-income developing 4.7 2.6 3.6 4.94 
Middle-income developing 3.8 2.21 4.01 5.11 
World 2.9 0.86 2.49 3.22 
Source: World Development Indicators for 1990–2000 and authors’ 
calculations for 2010–2050. 
Figure 9. GDP per capita scenarios 
 
Source: Based on IMPACT results of July 2011, computed from World 
Bank and United Nations population estimates (2008 revision). 
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low population. The “baseline scenario” combines the medium GDP 
projection with the medium population projection. Finally, the “pessimistic 
scenario” combines the low GDP projection with the high population 
projection. In all scenarios, China’s income growth exceeds those of the 
developed group of countries and most developing countries, although it is 
expected to slow from the current rapid pace. 
Note that the scenarios used apply to all countries; that is, in the optimistic 
scenario, every country in the world is assumed to experience high GDP 
growth and low population growth.  
The GDP per capita scenario results for China and the U.S. are 
summarized in Table 5. In the pessimistic scenario, U.S. per capita income 
increases less than 2 times while in the optimistic scenario, it almost triples 
between 2010 and 2050. The Chinese per capita income triples in the 
pessimistic scenario and increases almost 12 times in the optimistic scenario. 
However, despite China’s much more rapid growth than in the U.S. its per 
capita income in 2050 is still only one-fifth of that in the U.S. 
Table 5. China and U.S. per capita income scenario outcomes for 2010, 
2030, and 2050 (2000US$ per person) 
 2010 2030 2050 
Pessimistic 
 China  1,264 2,699 5,640 
 U.S.  37,504 51,132 58,291 
Baseline 
 China 1,627 4,590 13,584 
 U.S. 37,723 56,517 88,841 
Optimistic 
 China 1,551 6,433 20,000 
 U.S. 39,218 67,531 101,853 
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3 Results and Discussion 
3.1 Climate change impact on crop yield 
The yields of major crops (rice, wheat, maize, soybeans, and groundnuts) 
under each of the four climate scenarios through 2050 were simulated using 
the crop-specific CERES models of the DSSAT crop modeling system and 
subsequently compared to the current or baseline yields – which were also 
simulated using DSSAT – to drive the yield differences. For a specific 
locality, crop variety, soil and management practices were held constant 
across the entire simulation period. The obtained results for wheat, maize, and 
rice – under both irrigated and rainfed farming – were mapped for qualitative 
evaluation of climate change impact on crop yield in 2050 relative to yield 
under current climate in 2000 (Figure 10 and Figure 11 for maize; Figure S5 
through Figure S8 for wheat and rice). The legends of these figures were 
intentionally kept identical. Yield loss was mapped in yellowish/brownish 
colors and yield gain was mapped in greenish/bluish colors.  
The changes of the yields of maize, rice, and wheat under two typical 
GCMs – CSIRO and MIROC – cross-driven by the A1B and B1 emission 
scenarios, respectively, in 2050 over 2000 were summarized in Table 6. 
Chinese crops respond mildly to climate change. Irrigated yields tend to 
decrease, as in the case of maize in particular (Figure 10). This decrease 
would probably be caused by the decreasing availability of irrigation water 
due to more intense competition of water use from urban sprawl and due to 
groundwater depletion in major maize regions such as the North China Plain. 
Rainfed yields tend to increase because the expected warmer and wetter 
climates under both CSIRO and MIROC scenarios are favorable to these 
rainfed varieties (Figure 11). Overall, the yields of maize and rice will 
increase slightly, but the yield of wheat will decrease only marginally, by 
2050 under the climate change scenarios considered. 
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Table 6. Yield change under climate change scenarios in 2050 over 2000, % 
Scenario Maize Rice Wheat 
Irrigated 
CSIRO A1B –3.49 0.44 2.96 
CSIRO B1 –4.08 0.02 1.39 
MIROC A1B –4.18 
- 
–5.09 –9.81 
MIROC B1 –3.96 –1.92 –4.53 
Rainfed 
CSIRO A1B 3.75 12.38 2.01 
CSIRO B1 3.7 3.46 –2.11 
MIROC A1B 2.51 14.32 2.89 
MIROC B1 1.93 12.08 2.97 
Average 
CSIRO A1B 0.85 2.83 2.37 
CSIRO B1 0.59 0.71 –0.78 
MIROC A1B –0.17 –1.21 –1.94 
MIROC B1 –0.43 0.88 0.12 
All scenarios 0.21 0.80 –0.06 
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Figure 10. Yield change between 2000 and 2050 under four climate change scenarios: irrigated maize 
 
CNRM-CM3 GCM 
 
CSIRO-MK3 GCM 
Legend 
 
 
 
ECHAM5 GCM 
 
MIROC3.2 medium resolution GCM 
    Source: IFPRI calculations based on downscaled climate data and DSSAT model runs.  
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Figure 11. Yield change between 2000 and 2050 under four climate change scenarios: rainfed maize 
 
CNRM-CM3 GCM 
 
CSIRO-MK3 GCM 
Legend 
 
 
 
ECHAM5 GCM 
 
MIROC3.2 medium resolution GCM 
Source: IFPRI calculations based on downscaled climate data and DSSAT model runs.  
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3.2 Agricultural vulnerability outcomes 
The simulation results on production, yield, area, net export, and world price 
per crop under the three pathway scenarios are shown in Figure 12 through 
Figure 14 for wheat, maize and rice, respectively. The box and whisker plots 
are used in these figures to present the effects of climate change modeled by 
the MIROC and CSIRO GCMs under the A1B and B1 emission scenarios in 
the context of each of the economic and demographic pathways (optimistic, 
baseline, and pessimistic). Each box has 3 lines. The top line represents the 
75th percentile, the middle line represents the median, and the bottom line 
represents the 25th percentile. 
Wheat yield in China will increase steadily from 2010 to 2050 by 17%, 
partly due to the increase in factor inputs stimulated by the significant 
increase of world wheat price by 60% (Figure 12). Accordingly, wheat 
production will increase from 100 million tons in 2010 to 123 million tons in 
2050, although the wheat area remains constant at 24–25 million hectares 
during 2010–2050 under all scenarios.  
World maize price is projected to increase more than other cereals in 
percentage terms. Maize price doubles from about US$100 in 2010 to US$200 
in 2050 under all scenarios (Figure 13). As a result, the maize yield will jump 
by 45% from 5.1 tons per hectare in 2010 to 7.4 tons per hectare in 2050, 
despite the marginal effect of climate change on maize yield (Table 6). In line 
with the price increase, maize area will expand by 18% from 28 million 
hectares in 2010 to 33 million hectares in 2050. Consequently, maize 
production will increase significantly by 70%, from 140 million tons in 2010 
to 240 million tons in 2050.  
Although world prices of key commodities are all expected to rise under 
all scenarios, the pattern of rice price increase is more distinct. The rice price 
pathways diverge significantly depending on the overall scenario, with the 
pessimistic scenario leading to the highest prices (Figure 14) – a consequence 
of higher population and lower income in countries where rice is a staple for 
the poor. Even under the optimistic scenario, rice price will still rise by 40% 
during 2010–2050. Despite price increases, rice yield is expected to increase 
only slightly from 4.1 tons per hectare in 2010 to 4.7 tons per hectare in 2050. 
Rice production remains roughly constant until 2025 at 125 million tons, or a 
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3% increase over 2010, and then declines to 90% of current levels in 2050 as 
area devoted to rice declines from around 30 million hectares in 2010 to 23 
million hectares in 2050.  
The discrepancy between price increase and area decrease reflects the fact 
that demand for rice tends to decrease as income increases due to the effect of 
higher income on rice consumption and diet pattern change (Chern et al., 
2003; Kearney, 2010). It is interesting to observe that China will probably 
turn from a net importer of rice (slightly less than 5 million tons in 2010) to a 
net exporter by 2020 (Figure 14). Under the baseline and the optimistic 
overall scenarios in 2050, China is expected to have a surplus of 5–9 million 
tons of rice for export. Under the pessimistic scenario, China remains a net 
importer of rice by 2050 but with a much smaller volume of 1 million tons. 
Perhaps the most promising scenario result is that China will remain a 
major importer of maize from the world food market at the scale of ~20 
million tons per year, although the domestic production capacity is expected 
to grow constantly during 2010–2050, resulted from yield improvements and 
area expansions (Figure 13). Obviously, the imported maize will be 
overwhelmingly used as feed to meet the domestic demands of animal 
products (Chern et al., 2003; Ray et al., 2012). 
China is expected to become a smaller and smaller importer of wheat 
(Figure 12). The wheat self-sufficiency level will approach 100% by 2050 
under all scenarios. 
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Figure 12. Scenario outcomes for wheat production, yield, area, net export, and price 
 
Production 
 
Yield 
 
Area 
 
Net Exports 
 
Prices 
 
Source: Based on IMPACT results of July 2011. 
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Figure 13. Scenario outcomes for maize production, yield, area, net export, and price 
 
Production 
 
Yield 
 
Area 
 
Net Exports 
 
Prices 
 
Source: Based on IMPACT results of July 2011. 
 www.economics-ejournal.org  24 
Figure 14. Scenario outcomes for rice production, yield, area, net export, and price 
 
Production 
 
Yield 
 
Area 
 
Net Exports 
 
Prices 
 
Source: Based on IMPACT results of July 2011. 
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3.3 Human vulnerability outcomes 
Figure 15 shows scenario outcomes for the average daily kilocalories per 
capita, and Figure 16 shows the number of malnourished children under five. 
The story is much the same in both figures in qualitative terms. The baseline 
and optimistic scenarios show increases in calorie availability. The pessimistic 
scenario shows no increase but a stable level at about 3,000 kilocalories per 
day across the period 2010–2050. Climate change has relatively little effect 
within an overall scenario. 
These scenario levels of calorie availability are well above the 2020 goal 
of 2,600 kilocalories per day stipulated by the Chinese Food and Nutrition 
Development Strategy (MOA, 2002; Xu, 2011). These levels allow sufficient 
development rooms to meet higher nutrition requirements in China by 2050. 
The Chinese food security in terms of per capita calorie availability will be 
unlikely compromised by 2050.  
Figure 15. Average daily kilocalories availability under multiple income and climate 
scenarios (kilocalories per person per day) 
 
Source: Based on IMPACT results of July 2011. 
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As expected, the baseline and optimistic scenarios do best in reducing 
malnourished children. In the optimistic scenario the count drops close to 
zero, while with the baseline it falls from about 8 million children in 2010 to 
about 2 million in 2050. The pessimistic scenario is the least desirable from 
the perspective of reducing malnourished children. After a slow decline to just 
below 6 million by the mid-2020s, the decline stops and the number increases 
slightly.  
As the box and whiskers plots indicate, within a particular overall scenario 
climate change has relatively little impact on the number of malnourished 
children. The range in 2050 from the different climate scenarios is typically 
less than 1 million children malnourished. The reason, as discussed above, is 
the function of trade to buffer the impact of climate change on domestic food 
production. 
Figure 16. Number of malnourished children under 5 years of age under multiple income 
and climate scenarios 
 
                Source: Based on IMPACT results of July 2011. 
 www.economics-ejournal.org  27 
4 Conclusions and Recommendations 
China has been extraordinarily successful in transforming its highly planned 
economy into a free market-based system within a considerably short period of a 
few decades, especially in the agricultural sector which enables China to feed 
approximately 20% of the world’s population on less than 9% of the world’s 
cropland. The analysis of the IMPACT model results presented in this paper 
suggests that Chinese agriculture is relatively resilient to climate change compared 
to other parts of the world. In light of the slowing in population growth before 
~2030 and of the outlook of a decreasing population size thereafter, the overall 
status of the Chinese food security by the middle of the twenty-first century will 
unlikely be substantially compromised in the context of climate change. The 
human vulnerability outcomes shows that the daily calorie availability will be well 
above the officially stipulated level of 2,600 kilocalories per day, and that the 
mortality count of children under five years due to malnutrition will be 
continuously decreasing from the current levels, even under the most pessimistic 
scenario by 2050. The major challenges, however, will rise from the increasing 
demand of a richer diet (Ray et al., 2012) – driven by the rapid growth in income 
levels which are expected to double against the current levels in 2020 – coupled 
with regional disparities in the adaptive capacity to climate change. There is a 
particularly high level of uncertainty as to how climate change will play out in 
specific locations. The immediate implication of this point is that the grain 
handling and transportation facilities need to be reexamined, and repositioned if 
necessary, to ensure a fair spatial distribution. Smooth and timely shipments of 
large quantities of grains across regions should be considered as one of the first 
steps in China’s adaptive capacity building. 
The scenario outcomes of grain production, derived from the IMPACT results 
and shown in Figure 12 to Figure 14, depict a relatively optimistic outlook on 
yield, production and trade toward 2050. The maize yield, for example, is 
predicted to jump by 45% during 2010–2050, contrasting with the simulated effect 
of climate change on maize yield using the DSSAT crop model (Table 6). DSSAT 
simulation shows that climate change can cause max. 4% change in maize yield, 
either increase or decrease, between 2010 and 2050. The multi-scenario ensemble 
effect of 0.2% (Table 6) suggests that overall effect of climate change can even be 
neutral over a large country like China in this particular case. The fundamental 
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drivers behind these two differential rates of yield change, 45% versus 4%, are 
technology and trade. Technology development in terms of varietal performance 
and input use efficiency has been a major driver of yield improvements globally, 
as in the case of the Green Revolution (Evenson and Gollin, 2003). But over a 
shorter period of time, food price may play a more important role on raising crop 
yield by means of higher inputs. The jump of maize yield by 45%, as predicted by 
the IMPACT model, was associated with a sharp price increase by 100% during 
2010–2050. These two important processes of yield change, either biophysical or 
socioeconomic, were both considered by the IMPACT model but not by DSSAT. 
This simple observation of yield change drivers has profound implications on 
future food security. 
The first implication is on the importance of crop breeding for food security 
under climate change. Breeding and agronomic improvements have, on average, 
achieved a linear increase in global food production, at an average rate of 32 
million tons per year (Tester and Langridge, 2010). This rate has been sustained 
for more than 40 years. An even higher rate is needed for a growing population 
with a richer diet. This requires substantial changes for methods in agronomic 
processes and management practices. In China, production growth can only be 
realized through higher yields, given the decreasing trend and outlook in crop 
areas. As a recent study (Ye et al., 2013b) suggested, maintaining yield growth rate 
on a yearly basis has great significance in ensuring food security in China. 
Therefore, continued investment in enhancing agricultural productivity should 
remain a key policy element in managing climate risks facing Chinese agriculture. 
Joint efforts on crop breeding are needed to produce innovative varieties that 
maintain yields but tolerate drought, salinity, pests and diseases, and other climate 
shocks (Trethowan et al., 2010). The second implication is on the role of 
international trade in climate change adaptation, which is notably missing in the 
current thinking of climate change in China. As the IMPACT results show, open 
international trade is key to buffer the impact of climate change on domestic 
production and thus to maintain a stable supply through price and market effects. 
This illustrates the importance of keeping international trade open for Chinese 
food security; it also indicates the importance of vulnerability alleviation for the 
rural poor in designing adaptation strategies to cope with climate change. 
In a broader context, challenges of ensuring food security under climate 
change require urgent and substantial increase in the focus of research, innovation, 
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transformation of knowledge, and education at all levels across all sectors related 
to agriculture (Smith and Olesen, 2010). This is only possible through capacity 
building actions toward a harmonized system of climate change adaptation and 
mitigation through agricultural intensification for food security. Such actions 
involve not only national and local governments but also international 
organizations and the international research community. It is important to note that 
investment in agricultural research is an efficient long-term mitigation strategy 
since investment in yield improvements compares favorably with other commonly 
proposed mitigation strategies (Burney et al., 2010). It is also important to note 
that reforms in the governing scheme of the intellectual property rights are much 
needed to facilitate effective transfer and assimilation of climate change- and food 
security-related knowledge. 
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Figure S1. Yield and harvest area density of irrigated maize in year 2000 
 
             Source: SPAM Dataset. 
Figure S2. Yield and harvest area density of rainfed maize in year 2000 
 
           Source: SPAM Dataset. 
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Figure S3. Yield and harvest area density of irrigated rice in year 2000 
 
      Source: SPAM Dataset. 
Figure S4. Yield and harvest area density of rainfed rice in year 2000 
              
   Source: SPAM Dataset. 
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Figure S5. Yield change between 2000 and 2050 under four climate change scenarios: irrigated wheat 
 
                       Source: IFPRI calculations based on downscaled climate data and DSSAT model runs. 
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Figure S6. Yield change between 2000 and 2050 under four climate change scenarios: rainfed wheat 
 
                     Source: IFPRI calculations based on downscaled climate data and DSSAT model runs. 
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Figure S7. Yield change between 2000 and 2050 under four climate change scenarios: irrigated rice 
                       
                   Source: IFPRI calculations based on downscaled climate data and DSSAT model runs.   
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